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8.1 Introduction
Schumpeter's (1950) ideas about the role of innovation in modern
capitalist economies have inspired a substantial literature on the rela-
tionship betweenmarketstructure andinnovative activity. Thisliterature
has focused on Schumpeter's observation that seller concentration in-
fluences the appropriability of R&D. Unfortunately, as is apparent in
the surveys of Kamien and Schwartz (1975) and Scherer (1980), it is
unclear whether highly concentrated markets enhance the appropriabil-
ity of the returns to R&D (e.g., Schumpeter 1950) or whether the
opposite is true (Fellner 1951; Arrow 1962). In either case, industry
concentration is viewed as an important determinant ofR&D intensity.
With few exceptions (notably Phillips 1966, 1971), it was not until
recentlythat economiststurned their attentionto thereciprocal influence
of R&D on market structure. This new literature has emphasized
Schumpeter's oft-cited notion of "creative destruction," where market
structure is influenced by past and current innovative successes and
failures. Specifically, innovation generates transient market power; this,
in turn, is eroded by rival innovation and imitation. Thus, a truly Schum-
peterian framework requires that both market structure and R&D be
taken as endogenous variables. Seen in this perspective, the relation of
R&D and market structure must be explained by an appeal to more
fundamental factors that jointly determine concentration and R&D: the
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structure ofdemand; the richness oftechnological opportunities; and the
technological and institutional conditions governing appropriability.
A number of recent theoretical papers have attempted to capture the
essence of this Schumpeterian simultaneity. Among these contributions
are Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a, 1980b), Futia (1980), Lee and Wilde
(1980), Levin (1978), Loury (1979), and Nelson and Winter (1977,1978,
1980).1 The approach taken by Nelson and Winter is the most compre-
hensive in its representation of the relevant forces influencing market
structure and R&D intensity. The price of this generality is high, since
their models are analytically intractable and are open only to simulation.
By contrast, many ofthe remaining models are stark and highly stylized;
eachomits aspectsoftechnology andcompetitionthatareimportantfor a
broader understanding ofthe relationship between market structure and
R&D. For example, none ofthe above models is truly dynamic; market
structure is represented by the number of identical firms; only Futia
explicitly recognizesR&D spillovers wherefirms benefitfrom theefforts
of rivals; and finally, no attention is paid to other activities, such as
advertising, that affect market structure.
The problems hampering theoretical treatments of the simultaneity
issue have made rigorous tests of the Schumpeterian process extremely
difficult. To date only Levin (1981) and Farber (1981) have explored the
simultaneity issue in any detail. Only Levin has attempted to test for the
presence ofsimultaneity among the relevantvariables, butLevin's model
(in which concentration, private and government, R&D, advertising,
and price-cost margins are determined simultaneously) is specified in the
loose, eclectic manner that is characteristic of most empirical work in
industrial organization. Although the findings are encouraging, they can
onlyberegardedas apreliminarytestoftheneo-Schumpeteriantheories.
Inthis paperwe provide a moreexactingempiricaltest. Unfortunately,
in our efforts to formulate precise hypotheses, we are forced to ignore
several aspects ofSchumpeterian dynamics. Nonetheless, we are able to
incorporate several important features of reality which have heretofore
been missing in formal models ofthe R&D process. We begin with what
is perhaps the simplest of the theoretical models ofR&D and market
structure, the Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980a) model of noncooperative oli-
gopoly with free entry. We generalize this model by adding two signifi-
cantfeatures. First, we allow for spillovers in the knowledge generatedby
R&D. Hence, some fraction ofthe returns to each firm's R&D efforts
are appropriated by its rivals. Although we are not able at this stage to
1. Although they do not discuss the simultaneous determination ofR&D activity and
marketstructure, the work ofPakesand Schankerman (this volume) on the determinantsof
R&D spending is akin to the papers cited here in clear identification ofdemand, techno-
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incorporate a specific allocation of investment to imitative effort, as
Nelson and Winter do, we believe that our characterization of R&D
spillovers illuminates important aspects of the appropriability problem,
as we explain below. Second, we include advertising expenditures among
the decision variables of the firm. Like R&D, advertising is an instru-
ment of competition, and in many industries it is of greater empirical
consequence thanR&D. By thus enriching the model, we hope to gain a
more precise understanding ofthe role ofboth R&D and advertising in
Schumpeterian competition.
An attractive feature of our approach is that the general model con-
tains a family of nested models that can be tested using classical proce-
dures. For example, by constraining the value of certain parameters
(namely, thedegreeofR&D spillovers andtheelasticityofdemandwith
respect to advertising) the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model falls out as a special
case of our own model. In addition, questions concerning the effects of
imperfect appropriability ofR&D returns can be reduced to considera-
tions of the magnitudes or signs of certain parameters in the model.
We believe our approach to be an attractive one, but we must caution
the reader at the outset that limitations of both theory and data still
preclude a fully satisfactory treatment ofthe issues we explore here. The
model remains quite stark, abstracting from at least four issues of un-
doubted importance. First, the model is one of a static industry equilib-
rium, which is hardly in the spirit of the Schumpeterian dynamic dis-
equilibrium arguments. Second, we take no account of uncertainty,
which even in the absence ofrisk aversion has important implications for
the allocation ofR&D effort. Third, to make the analysis tractable, we
consider only symmetric industry equilibria, where all firms within an
industry are identical. Fourth, we consider only cost-reducing R&D,
neglecting the well-known fact that most industries devote a majorshare
oftheir innovative efforts to developing new products and improving the
quality of existing products. In future work, we plan to generalize our
modelto takeaccount ofdynamics, uncertainty, asymmetry, andproduct
R&D.
Limitations of the data constrain our efforts as well. Our model is
designed for testing on a cross section of industries, but R&D data are
available for industries only at a highly aggregated level, requiring us to
aggregate data on other variables up to this level. Even more serious are
deficiencies in the operationalmeasures oftechnological opportunityand
appropriability. In this paper, we rely on relatively crude proxies.
However, together with several colleagues, we have recently initiated
work on the direct measurement of opportunity and appropriability
conditions through a survey ofR&D managers. When collected, these
data should substantially improve the reliability of the empirical results
obtainable with this or any related econometric model.178 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 8.2 pre-
sents and analyzes the model. Section 8.3 develops the empirical spe-
cification. The data and the econometric techniques are discussed in
section 8.4. In section 8.5 the econometric results are presented and
interpreted, and section 8.6 indicates directions for future research.
8.2 A Model ofR&D with Spillovers
We begin by considering a firm that seeks to maximize profit with the
use of three instruments: output, R&D expenditures, and advertising
expenditures. Following Dasgupta and Stiglitz, we assume that a firm's
R&D expenditure serves to shift downward its unit costfunction, which
is independent of output, but we generalize their formulation to include
the effect of industrywide R&D on cost. Thus, unit cost of firm i is
(1)
where Xi is the R&D expenditure ofthe ith firm, and Z is the sum ofthe
R&D expenditures of all firms in the industry, including firm i.
2 It is
further assumed that CI, C2 < 0, and CII, C22 > 0; thatis, there are positive
but decreasing returns to both own R&D and to industrywide R&D.
This formulation emphasizes an importantaspect ofR&D technology
neglected in most analytic models-external economies. An increase in
theR&D expenditures offirm inot only reduces its own cost, butit also,
through its "spillover" effect on Z, reduces the cost of all other firms in
the industry. This characterization captures a central aspect of the
appropriability issue; specifically, the cost function indicates the tech-
nological dimension of appropriability. To the extent that unit cost
reduction is very elastic with respect to increments in the industrywide
pool of R&D (holding own R&D constant), we infer that costless
imitation is relatively easy, orthat, technologically, the returns toR&D
arerelatively inappropriable. Weshallindicate shortlyhow appropriabil-
ity also has structural and behavioral dimensions.
Since our primary interest attaches to the analysis ofR&D, we take a
somewhat simpler approach with respect to advertising and its effect on
demand. In particular, we assume that advertising shifts the industry
demand curve. In principle, we could model advertising as altering the
firm's own demand curve as well as spilling over to alter the demands
facing all other firms. Such a characterization would reveal clearly the
complete analogy between the roles of appropriability andR&D, since
the appropriability of advertising also has technological, structural, and
behavioraldimensions. Instead, we simply represent theindustryinverse
demand curve as:
2. Equation (1) can be generalized to include spillovers of R "& D undertaken in other
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(2) p = p(Q,A),
where Q = ~qi represents industry output, and A = ~ai represents total
advertising expenditures of all firms in the industry. We further assume
that PI< 0, P2>0, and P22 < O.
The problem facing the ith firm is, therefore,
(3)
We assume thatfirms entertainCournotconjecturesregardingtheoutput
and advertising levels of all other firms. That is, we assume that the ith
firm conjectures that dQldqi = 1 and dAldai = 1. However, to bring
clearly to the fore the full range ofissues regarding the appropriabilityof
R&D, we parameterize the conjectural variation with respect to
R&D. Thatis, weletdZIdxi = a i. Later,we shallexploreseveralspecial
cases by fixing a i.
We now write down the first-order conditions for the maximization of





- (CI + C28Jqi = 1, and
where E = piQPI, the price elasticity of demand,3 and Si = qilQ, the
market share of the ith firm.
We assume free entrysuch that the maximizedprofits ofall firms in the
industryaregreaterthanorequaltozero, while profitsofall firms outside
(potential entrants) are less than or equal to zero for all nonnegative
levelsofoutput. Wefurther restrictourattentiontosymmetricequilibria,
where all firms in theindustrybehaveidentically. Thislatterrestrictionis,
ofcourse, less than desirable in a model purporting to represent Schum-
peterian competition, but we have found that consideration ofasymmet-
ric equilibria raises some extremely difficult analytical problems.
DasguptaandStiglitzhaveshownthat, given certainrestrictionsonthe
parameters, symmetric free entry equilibria exist. Somewhat more com-
plicated restrictions on the parameters are necessary in the present
model, but a wide range of parameter values remain consistent with
equilibrium. Dasgupta and Stiglitz have also derived conditions under
which theprofitofeachfirm intheindustryis approximatelyequaltozero
in a symmetric equilibrium. Of course, it is perfectly plausible that the
3. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a) use the notation E to represent the quantityelasticityof
inverse demand. We find that intuition is facilitated by reverting to the more customary
notation.180 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
technology ofR&D (or of advertising) would be such that equilibrium
contains a very small number of firms earning nonnegligible profit, but
the entry ofoneadditional firm would result in negativeprofitsfor all. 4In
what follows, we assume that the zero-profit condition can be invoked.
Thus, we close the model by noting that each firm earns zero profit in
equilibrum:
(7)
Beforeproceeding, itis worth pointingout (in the mannerofDasgupta
and Stiglitz) that conditions (4)-(7) may be used to illustrate that a
market equilibrium involving cost-reducing and demand-shifting activi-
ties, such as R&D and advertising, will not result in a socially optimal
allocation of resources. Conditions (4) and (7) indicate that prices must
deviate from marginal cost to sustain R&D and advertising expendi-
tures. Moreover, the left-handsides of(5) and (6) show thatthe marginal
private benefit ofR&D and advertising depends on the firm's scale of
output, whereas social optimality would require that the market output,
Q, be substituted for qi in these expressions.
We now proceed to analyze the market equilibrium in greater detail.
First, note that in a symmetric equilibrium with n identical firms, qi == q,
Xi == X, ai == a, 0i == e, and Si == 1/n, for all firms. The zero-profit condition
can then besummed over all firms by multiplying both sides of(7) by n to
yield:
(8) [p(Q, A) - c(x, Z)] Q == nx + na.
Dividing both sides by pQ, we have
p -c
(9) p = R+S,
where the left-handside is the Lernerindexofmonopolypower, R, is the
ratio ofindustryR&D to sales, and 5 is the ratio ofadvertising to sales.
Combining (9) and (4), we have
(10)
1
- == E (R + 5),
n
where 1/n is the Herfindahl index of concentration. This striking result
says thatindustryconcentrationis proportionatetothesumofR&D and
advertising intensity, where the elasticity of demand is the factor of
proportionality. Our result parallels that of Dasgupta and Stiglitz, who,
by neglecting advertising (5 == 0), arrive at 1/n == ER.
Wechoosetotreat (10) as a structuralequationfor concentrationinthe
econometric work which follows. Since we derived (10) from the first-
4. The problem with the zero-profit condition arises from the requirement that n be
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order condition (4) and the zero-profit condition (7), we now use (5) and
(6) to derive structural equations for R&D intensity and advertising
intensity, respectively.
Multiplying both sides of (5) by R = xlpq gives:
(11)
(13)
Simple manipulation of (11) yields
(12) - (cIx + czze)E- = R.
c cn p
Butinspectionofequation (9) reminds us thatclp = 1 - (R + S). We also
observethat - (cIxlc) can beinterpreted as the elasticityofunitcost with
respecttox, holding Z constant, which we will denote as a = a(xIZ), and
that - (czZlc) is the elasticity of unit cost with respect to Z, holding x
constant, which we denote as "I = 'Y(Zlx). It follows that (12) can be
rewritten as:
R = a + "Ie .
1 - (R + S) n
The numerator of the left-hand side of (13) is the ratio of R&D to
sales, while the denominator is the share ofsales revenue that is devoted
to neither R&D nor advertising. In zero-profit equilibrium this is just
equivalentto the ratio ofproduction cost to revenue. Thus, the left-hand
sideof(13) is simplythe ratio ofR&D to totalproductioncost, a variant
ofthe more familiar representation ofR&D intensity, typically used in
econometric work.
Wecaninterpret (13) as a structuralequationinwhichR&Dintensity
depends on two terms. The first, a, is the elasticity of unit cost with
respect to own R&D, holding industrywide R&D constant. It seems
reasonable to interpret a as a measure of technological opportunity,
indicating the responsiveness ofcost to own research effort. The second
term, "lain, has three components, each of which represents one of the
dimensions of appropriability mentioned previously. We noted that "I,
the elasticity of unit cost with respect to industrywide R&D (holding
own R&D constant), is a reasonable measure of the technological
dimension of appropriability, since it represents the extent to which a
firm benefits from an increase in the common pool ofR&D effort. On
the other hand, since a firm's own R&D effort augments the common
pool, higher levels of "I are associated with greater R&D intensity as
long as the conjectural variation, 8, is positive.
Appropriability has a structural dimension as well, which was empha-
sized by Schumpeter (1950) and later by Galbraith (1956). For any given
technologyofR&D andmarketsize, a firm's appropriablebenefitsfrom182 Richard C. LevinIPeter C. Reiss
augmenting the common pool ofknowledge depend on its market share,
which is lin in a symmetric equilibrium. On the conjecture that rivals do
not respond (8 == 1), a 1 percent increase in own R&D produces a lin
percent increase in industrywide R&D. Thus, whereas a monopolist's
costs fall by "{ percent for a 1 percent increase in its contribution to the
commonpool, an oligopolist's costs fall only by "{In percent. Throughthis
mechanism, the intensity ofR&D increases with the greater appropri-
ability associated with a more concentrated market structure.
Finally, thereis a behavioraldimension to appropriability, represented
here by the conjectural variation parameter, 8. It is easy to show that the
Cournotconjecture, 8 == 1, results in a Nash equilibrium when combined
with our previous assumptions that firms have Cournot conjectures in
output and advertising decisions. Butsome informal arguments concern-
ing the disincentive effects of spillover in R&D implicity contain pre-
sumptions that 8< 1. To the extent that firm j can costlessly borrow
knowledgefromfirm i'sR&Deffort, itmay chooseto beafree riderand
cut back onits ownR&D. Ifthe free-rider effect is sufficiently strong, e
mayeven benegative; thatis, aonedollarincrease inR&Dexpenditure
byfirm imayproducecutbacksin theR&D expenditures ofthe remain-
ing firms that exceed one dollar in the aggregate. Such negative conjec-
tural variations produce market equilibria that are not Nash equilibria,
but the idea that free-rider effects are important in R&D is sufficiently
well entrenchedin the literature (e.g., Nelson 1959) towarranttestingfor
evidence of its presence.
In the empirical work that follows, we will examine several special
cases ofthe model in which etakes on prespecified values, as well as the
case in which 8 is free to vary. In particular, we will examine cases in
which the value of8 is assumed to be 0,1, and n, respectively. In the first
case, the free-rider effect is such that rivals exactly offset a change in firm
i'sR&D, leaving industryR&D constant. The second is the Cournot-
Nash case. In the third case, eachfirm behaves as ifit expects its action to
be matched by all others. This is the R&D analog ofthe Chamberlinian
"constant market shares" conjecture. We shall test whether the data
permit rejection of any of these three hypotheses about the value of e.
Equations (10) and (13) represent structural equations for concentra-
tion and R&D intensity, respectively. We now derive a third equation
for advertising intensity. Multiplying both sides of the first-order condi-
tion (6) by Alp and dividing both sides by qi gives:
A A
(14) P2 - == - .
P pqi
The left-hand side of (14) is the advertising elasticity ofinverse demand,
which we denote as 1")- Dividing both sides of (14) by n we have183
(15)




where S is the ratio of industry advertising to sales, AIpQ.
It is easily shown that this expression for advertising intensity is simply
a generalizationoftheDorfman-Steiner (1954) rule to theoligopolycase.
Note that at any given price
(16) 11 = ap A = ~ ap QaQ A = 1,
aA p aQ p aA Q E
where <P is the advertisingelasticityofdemand, and E is thepriceelasticity
of demand or, equivalently, the reciprocal of the inverse elasticity of
demand. Thus, substituting (16) into (15), we have
S==~,
En
which is, of course, identical to the familiar Dorfman-Steiner result
when, in the monopoly case, n == 1.
To summarize, we have now derived three structural equations repre-





1 n== E(R + S),
R == a + 'Y<P and
1 - (R + S) n '
S==±.
En
These structural relations are reasonably general, although they do de-
pendonthe special assumptionsofsymmetryandofCournotconjectures
in advertisingandoutput.
5Inaddition, E, <p, a, and 'Y neednotbeconstant
parameters. However, by specializing the cost and demand functions
they become so, and it becomes possible both to solve for reduced form
equations for n, R, and S and to operationalize the model for empirical
work. Thus, we assumethatbothcost andinversedemandfunctions have
constant elasticities, so that
(18) C(x, Z) == ~x-az--y, and
5. It is easy to see that the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model is a special case of our own-
implicitly they asume 'Y = e = O. Under these conditions, the model reduces to two
structural equations for market structure and R&D: lin = ER and RI(l - R) = a. It is
readily verified that these equations are equivalentto those contained in Dasgupta-Stiglitz
(1980a).184 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
(19) p(Q, A) = (J"l/EA'llQ-l/E.




The model we have developed consists ofthree endogenous variables:
the Herfindahl indexofconcentration (H = 1/n), research intensity, and
advertising intensity. These three variables are jointlydetermined by the
parameters of the cost and demand functions, which presumably differ
across industries, and by the behavioralparameter, e. Weproposeto test
the model using cross-section data at the industry level to determine
whether interindustry differences in opportunity, appropriability, and
demand satisfactorily explain differences in concentration, R&D, and
advertising. For the present we assume that e is constant across all
industries, except in the special case where e = n, and we test various
hypotheses concerning its value.
AlthoughtheendogenousvariablesH,R, andS aredirectlyobservable
(at least in principle), the exogenous parameters E, <p, u, and ~ are not.
Since estimates ofthe price elasticity ofdemand exist for a wide range of
industries, we treat Ek as an observable exogenous variable for the kth
industry. Next, tomaketheestimationproblemtractable, we assume that
Uk, the elasticity of unit cost with respect to own R&D in the kth
industry, is a function ofa vector ofobservables representing technolog-
ical opportunity. Similarly, ~k, the elasticity of unit cost with respect to
industrywide R&D, is assumed to be a function of observables repre-
senting the degree ofR&D spillovers (the technological dimension of
appropriability). Finally, <Pk' the advertising elasticity of demand, is
assumed to be a function ofobservable attributes ofthe industry's prod-
uct. In the absence of any strong theoretical presumption, Ctk(·)' ~k(·)'
and <Pk(·) are each assumed to be linear in parameters with an additive
error term of mean zero. These errors are assumed to be uncorrelated
with each other and uncorrelated with the error terms in the model's
structural equations.
We can now write down a system of equations that can be estimated.
Assuming that (10) is observed with multiplicative error and taking
logarithms, we have
(21) log H = ao + al(logE) + a2[log(R + S)] + el.
The model makes very precise predictions about the signs and magni-
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separately and jointly, that ao = 0 and al = a2 = 1. Itshould be recalled
that the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model is a special case ofourown when <p = "Y
= o. We can compare estimates of (21) with estimates of
(22) log H = a~ + at (loge) + a2 (logR) + et,
(24)
to determine whether anything is gained by adding advertising to the
model.
The second equation takes the general form:
(23) R = a(o) + eHy(o) + e2,
1- (R + S)
where errors are contained in the a (e) and "Y (e) expressions as noted
above. Substituting for aCe) and "Y(e), we have
R =[bo +( I bmOPPm) +u]
1-(R+S) m=l
+ eH[co + C;l CnAPPn) + v] + e2,
where OPPm is an element in an M-dimensional vector of variables
measuring technological opportunity, and APPn is an element in an
N-dimensional vector of variables measuring the technological condi-
tions of appropriability. Before specifying these opportunity and appro-
priability measures, two general comments about (24) are in order.
First, the combined error term in equation (24), e2 + u + vaH, has
undesirable properties, except in cases where ais assumed to be either
zero or n. In the general case, (24) implies that the concentration term,
H, has a random coefficient equal to a(eo + v). We will discuss this
problem in section 8.4.
Second, it will notbepossible toidentifyafrom the parametersof(24),
since amultiplies each coefficient in "Y(e). Nevertheless, it will be possible
to test specific hypotheses about the value ofa. Forexample, the hypoth-
esis thata = 0 implies that the coefficients ofthe last N + 1terms ofthe
estimated equation are jointly equal to zero. In fact, we cannot distin-
guish between the hypotheses that a = 0 and "Y = 0, since the latter
carries the same implication for the coefficients of (24). Rejection ofthis
hypothesis, however, is equivalent to rejection of the Dasgupta-Stiglitz
specification, in which "Y = O.
We will also be able to test whether a = n, the "constant R&D
shares" conjecture, since aH = 1 under this assumption. The specifica-
tion resulting from this hypothesis is not nested in the empirical specifica-
tion ofthe general model, since theelementsin the APPvectornow enter
directly rather than interactively with H. We can, however, test the186 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
hypothesis e == n against e == O. Unfortunately, the hypothesis that
conjectures are Cournot (e == 1) cannot be tested.
Given the available data, we have at bestcrude proxies for technologi-
cal opportunity and appropriability. As noted in section 8.1, we are
engaged in an effort to develop better measures through a survey of
R&D managers. For the present, however, we follow and extend
somewhat the approach of Levin (1981).
Opportunities for technical advance depend in part on the particular
"science base" of an industry's technology. This suggests adopting the
approach of Scherer (1965, 1967), who used dummy variables to classify
industries as mechanical, chemical, electrical, or biological. We add
metallurgical to this list as the excluded category in the regressions
reported below. To represent the "closeness" of an industry's link to
science, we use the share ofbasic research expenditures in total industry
R&D. Life cycle models of industry evolution suggest that opportuni-
ties may increase in the early years of technological development, be-
cause technology is "cumulative" (e.g., Nelson 1981; Nelson and Winter
1982). Later, technological opportunities may be exhausted as industries
reach maturity. This suggests that a variable representing industry age
should be included among the opportunity measures in both linear and
quadratic form. Finally, government policy may affect technological
opportunity. Itseemsreasonableto hypothesizethatgovernment-funded
R&D is complementary to private effort, thus increasing the elasticity
of unit cost with respect to private R&D. Thus, to summarize, we
postulate that a(·) is:
(25) a == bo + bl(ELEC) + b2(CHEM) + b3(BIO) + b4(MECH)
+ bs(BASIC) + b6(AGE) + b7(AGE
2
)
+ bs(GOVRDS) + u,
where the first four variables are the technology base dummies described
above, BASICis the ratio ofbasicR&D to total industryR&D, AGE
is industry age, and GOVRDS is the ratio ofgovernment-fundedR&D
to sales. Our expectation is that bs, b6, bs > 0, and b7 < 0.
6 We do not
have strong prior beliefs about the relative opportunity of each of the
technology types, although we expect bl > 0 over the period covered by
our data (1963-72).
6. There is an alternative expectation for the parameters b6 and b7 consistent with our
discussion of the life cycle of technological opportunity. Our operational measure of
industry age is based on the number ofyears since each four-digit industry first appeared in
the StandardIndustrial Classification (SIC), and it is entirely possible that the "early"years
of the life cycle in which technological opportunity is growing typically occur before an
industry is classified by the BureauofCensus. Under these circumstances, we would expect
ex to decline with age. Thus, we would not besurprised to find b6 < O. Itis even possible that
b7 > 0 would be consistent with our expectations, provided the age at which opportunity is
minimized is beyond the range of our observations.187 Tests of a Schumpeterian Model of R&D and Market Structure
The extent of interfirm spillovers of R&D depends both on legal-
institutional features of the environment and on characteristics of the
product or technology. For example, there are probably important in-
terindustry differences in the effectiveness of patent protection. The
inherent complexity ofproducts and processes is also relevant to the ease
of imitation. But these aspects of appropriability remain unmeasured.
It is widely believed, however, that products, which can be examined
directly by rivals, are more easily imitated than process innovations.
Thus, the share of R&D expenditures devoted to new or improved
products .should be positively related to "I, the degree of spillovers.
Fortunately, McGraw-Hill collects data of this sort, and recent work of
Scherer (1981) presents alternative estimates derived from patent data.
Scherer'swork also suggests anotherpossible measure ofappropriabil-
ity. Industries differ widely in the extent to which they develop their own
process technology or "borrow" it in the form of R&D embodied in
capital goods and intermediateproducts. It seems reasonable to presume
that interfirm R&D spillovers within the industry are positively associ-
ated with the share of process R&D that is "borrowed" rather than
generated internally. This presumption rests on the idea that R&D
within the industry spills over more readily if the participants are using a
common process technology. If most process R&D is developed "in-
house," it is more likely that firms have idiosyncratic technologies, and
spillovers are less important. Thus, we take the ratio ofborrowedR&D
to total R&D "used" by an industry as another determinant of "I.
Finally, government funding ofR&D frequently carries restrictions
on appropriability, such as mandatorylicensing. Thus, we expectgovern-
ment R&D to increase the extent of spillovers in an industry.
To summarize, we specify "I(e) as:
(26) "I == Co + Cl(PROD) + C2(BORROW) + C3 (GOVRDS) + v,
where PROD is the share ofR&D devoted to new or improved prod-
ucts, BORROWis the ratio ofR&Dembodiedin inputs to totalR&D
used (whereR&D used by anindustryis thesum ofR&D embodiedin
inputs and its own processR&D), and GOVRDS is the ratio ofgovern-
ment R&D to sales. We expect Cl, C2, and C3>0.
We now move to the third equation ofthe model, which we express in
log-linear form:
This equation resembles the concentration equation (21), in that the
modeldictates theprecisehypothesesthat do == 0; d1, d2, d3 == 1. Hereour
problem is complicated because <p, the advertising elasticity of demand,188 Richard C. Levin/Peter Ce Reiss
cannot be observed directly. We assume, however, that <f> is a function of
product attributes that can be observed. Specifically, we assume that <f>
depends on whether the product in question is a consumer orproducer's
good, which we measure by the ratio of personal consumption expendi-
tures to total industry sales. Moreover, in line with arguments advanced
in the literature on advertising, we expect the responsiveness ofdemand
to advertising to depend in part on whether the product is a durable one.
Advertising is likely to have greater impact on the demand for nondur-
ables, since other sources, such as retailers and other customers, tend to
be relied on for information about long-lived products. We also add an
interaction term, since the latter distinction is likely to be more pro-
nounced for consumer goods.
7 Thus, we specify <f>(e) as:
(28) <f> = exp [go +gl(PCE) + g2(DUR) + g3 (PCE*DUR) + w]'
where PCEis the shareofpersonalconsumptionexpendituresin industry
sales, and DUR is a dummy variable representing a durable good. We
expect gl> 0, and g2, g3 < o.
Wechoose an exponentialform of <f>(e) for reasons oftractability, since
substitutionof(28) into (27) will now yield an equationthatis linearinthe
parameters. Nonetheless, estimates of do and d1 cannot be recovered,
since they appear only in combination with the coefficients of <f> (e). On
the maintained hypothesis that do = 0 and d1 = 1, however, it is possible
to identify these lattercoefficients and to generate estimatesof <f> for each
industry.
One additionalissue requires discussion before the empirical specifica-
tion is complete. It would be possible to treat government R&D as an
exogenous policy instrumentinfluencing opportunity and appropriability
and, hence, private R&D. Yet there is considerable plausibility to the
view that government R&D decisions are influenced by opportunity
and appropriability conditions, even if not in quite the same way as
privatedecisions are affected. Inparticular, thegovernmentmay attempt
to compensate for the inappropriability ofR&D returns by allocating
R&D funds to industries where spillovers are high and where concen-
7. Our argument abour durability is based on the insights of Porter (1974), which are
employedin the subsequentwork ofCaves, Porter, andSpence (1980). Porterdistinguishes
between "convenience" goods, for which advertising is the principal form ofselling effort,
and "nonconvenience" goods, for which the buyer typically seeks information from other
sources. InPorter'sscheme, convenience goods are nondurable, purchasedfrequently, and
sold at a low unit price. Operationally, at the highly aggregated level of our data, the
classification of industries as producers of nondurables and durables is identical to the
classification based on Porter's scheme.
Caves, Porter, and Spence claim that advertising intensity should be higher in conveni-
ence goods industries, but this conclusion does not strictly follow from their argument.
Instead, they offer good reasons why the ratio ofadvertising to otherforms ofselling effort
should be higher for convenience goods, butno reasons why the ratio ofadvertising to sales
should be higher.189 Tests of a Schumpeterian Model of R&D and Market Structure
tration is low. This view receives support from the previous exploratory
model ofLevin (1981), where the hypothesis that GOVRDS is uncorre-
lated with the error term in the private R&D equation is decisively
rejected in a test based on the work ofWu (1973), Hausman (1978), and
Reiss (1981). Although a truly satisfactory model ofgovernmentR&D
allocationwould give due weight topolitical forces, we observe thatmost
ofthe variance ofgovernment differences in R&D expenditures across
industries is explained by government procurement policy. Put simply,
the government supports R&D in industries where it is a major cus-
tomer; this holds especially for defense procurements. Therefore, we
specify that the ratio of government R&D to sales is determined by:
(29) GOVRDS = ho + hI (DEFSHR) + h2(GOVSHR)
+ h3H + (Mgl h3+ m OPPm )
+ C~l h3 + M + nAPPn ) + e4,
where DEFSHRis the shareofindustrysales going to thefederal govern-
ment for defense purposes, and GOVSHR is the share of industry sales
purchased by the federal government for other purposes.
8.4 The Data and Estimation Issues
Table 8.1 provides definitions, scalings, and the sources of the data
used in this study. Table 8.2furnishes sample statistics for these data. We
have already discussed in some detail the difficulties involved in measur-
ing opportunity and appropriability and the rationale behind our mea-
sures. Most of the remaining variables are conventional and require no
further comment (for further reference, see Levin 1981). We will, how-
ever, commentbrieflyonthe measurementofR&D expenditures, price
elasticities of demand, and concentration before discussing estimation
procedures.
Theonlydefinitionally consistentindustryR&Dexpendituredataare
those tabulated by the Bureau of the Census for the National Science
Foundation (NSF). Unfortunately, they are only available for highly
agregated NSF industryclassifications. Oursample consists ofthe twenty
basic manufacturing industries for which data are available since 1963.
These industries are a composite of four-, three-, and two-digit SIC
classifications (see table 8.2). Since industry data on such variables as
concentration and the number of firms are only available for Census of
Manufactures surveyyears (1963, 1967, and 1972), oursampleconsists of
sixty observations.
On the demand side, we use the price elasticities calculated by Levin190 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
Table 8.1 Variable Definitions and Data Sources





















Herfindahl index of concentration (computed from COM)
Company-financedR&D expenditures divided by value ofshipments (NSF,
COM)a
Advertising expenditures divided by industry output (10)
Research intensity; RI(l - R - S)
Government-financed R&D expenditures divided by value of shipments
(NSF, COM)a
Price elasticity of demand (Almon, 10)
Industry technology base predominantly electrical (scaled 0-1)
Industry technology base predominantly chemical (scaled 0-1)
Industry technology base predominantly biological (scaled 0-1)
Industry technology base predominantly mechanical (scaled 0-1)
Industry technology base predominantly metallurgical (scaled 0-1)
Basic R&D expenditures divided by total R&D (NSF)
Years since industry first appeared in Census ofManufactures with substan-
tially same definition as today (COM)
Square of AGE
Share of industry R&D expenditures devoted to new or improved products
(McGraw-Hill)
R&D embodied in inputs divided by totalR&D "used," where latter is the
sum of own expenditures on process R&D and R&D embodied in inputs
(Scherer)
Personal consumption expenditures divided by industry sales (10)
Dummy variable set equal to one for durable goods, zero otherwise
Federal government purchases for national defense purposes divided by
industry sales (I0)
Federal government purchases for purposes other than national defense
divided by industry sales (10)
Key to Data Sources:
Code Source
Almon Almon, C., et al. 1974. 1985: Interindustry forecasts of the American
economy. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
COM U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1963, 1967,1972. Census ofmanufactures.
Washington, D.C.: GPO.
10 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1963,
1967, 1972. Input-output tables for the United States. Washington, D.C.:
GPO.
McGraw-Hill McGraw-Hill. Economics Department. Annualsurveysofbusinessplans
for research and development. Mimeo, annually.
NSF National Science Foundation, Research and development in industry.
Washington, D.C.: GPO, annually.
Scherer Scherer, F. M. 1981. Thestructure ofindustrial technology flows. North-
western University and FTC. Mimeo.
aR & D expenditure data were deflated by a salary index for chemists and engineers
constructed from data in U.S. Bureau ofLabor Statistics, National Survey ofProfessional,
Administrative, Technical, and Clerical Pay. Washington, D.C.: GPO, annually. Industry-
specific employment weights for chemists and engineers were taken from BLS Bulletin no.
1609, Scientific and Technical Personnel in Industry, 1961-66. Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1968. Value of shipment data were deflated by use ofsectoral output price deflators made










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4192 Richard C. LevinlPeter C. Reiss
(1981). These were computed using time-series estimates of constant
elasticity demand functions made by Almon and his colleagues (1974).
These estimates are available for fifty-six input-output sectors in which
thepredominantfraction ofoutputgoes topersonalconsumption. Onthe
rather strong pair ofassumptions that all outputin the fifty-six consumer
goods sectors goes to personal consumption and that all output of the
remaining maufacturing industries finds its way into consumer goods
industries, derived elasticities ofdemand were calculated for each ofthe
input-outputsectors in manufacturing. To the extentthatsome output of
the fifty-six consumer goods industries is used as intermediate input oras
investment goods and to the extent that some output of the remaining
industriesis consumeddirectly, the calculatedelasticitieswill be biasedin
uncertain direction and magnitude. Nevertheless, the procedure pro-
duces no serious anomalies; the relative magnitudes of the elasticities
across industries accord reasonably well with intuition.
The most difficult data problem we confront is to develop an opera-
tional analog of n, the number of firms. Obviously, the rather special
assumption of symmetric firm size is not consistent with the observed
heterogeneity of firm sizes. Our approach here is to instead view n as a
numbers equivalent (see, for example, Hart 1971) and to regard (22) as
an approximation to a world with heterogeneous firm sizes. Ourpractical
problem is how to summarize the empirical size distribution offirms by a
numbers equivalent. Forthis purpose we choose to treat n as the Herfin-
dahl numbers equivalent.
To obtain an operational measure, we must therefore construct a
Herfindahl index for each sample industry. Since the empirical size
distributions offirms are available in an incomplete form (e.g., C4, C8,
C20, C50, etc.), we chose to fit two distributions (the Pareto and the
exponential) to the available datafor eachfour-digit industry. Ofthe two
distributions the exponential provided the more satisfactory approxima-
tion. Using the estimated parameters of these size distributions, we
simulated the Herfindahl indexfor each four-digit industry andthen used
a weighted average offour-digit Herfindahl indexes to represent concen-
tration at the more aggregated level of our sample. The resulting index
values, which appear in table 8.2, are quite plausible. At the four-digit
level, the correlation between the four-firm concentration ratio and our
estimated Herfindahl index is .91.
We now turnto estimationproblems. While estimationofthe advertis-
ing and concentration equations involves straightforward application of
nonlinear two-stage least-squares procedures, estimation of the R&D
equation is not straightforward. As noted above, the problem arises
because ofthe error in observing 'Y, which leads to a random coefficient
on the concentration term, unless 'Y ore = 0, e = n, or (T~ = 0. That is,
the system (22), (24), and (27) will not require attention to the random193 Tests of a Schumpeterian Model ofR&D and Market Structure
coefficient problem in three cases. (1) when 'Y ore = 0, firms behave as
Dasgupta-Stiglitzfirms, and appropriability does not affectR&Dinten-
sity; (2) whene = n, concentrationdrops outoftheR&Dequation; and
(3) if ~k is measuredwithout error, no randomness is in the concentration
coefficient.
Thethirdofthese specialcases is the leastprobable. Thus, ifwe wish to
estimate the model without prespecifying e, we must deal with the
problem of random coefficients in a nonlinear simultaneous equations
context. To date, only Kelejian (1974) has suggested a procedure for the
linear simultaneous equations model with random coefficients, and for
our model his specialized results are inapplicable.
Although we have not been able to find a fully efficient random
coefficient estimator for our model, we are able to show that consistent
estimates of the parameters in (24) can be obtained by nonlinear in-
strumentalvariables techniques. Detailsconcerning the assumptions em-
ployed and a rigorous statement of this result are available from the
authors on request.
The more serious problem arising from the random coefficient version
of (24) is the possible inconsistency of conventional approximations to
the asymptotic standard errors of the coefficients. This inconsistency
results from the heteroscedastic disturbance term. Our approach to this
problem is to apply a generalized least-squares (GLS) correction to our
instrumental variables estimator. To do this we must estimatea; and a~.
We do so by an auxiliary regression technique that uses the squared
residuals from the initial instrumental variables estimates (see Hildreth
and Houck 1968).
8.5 The Results
Table8.3 summarizesthefull specificationofourfour-equation model,
along with theexpectedsigns andparameterrestrictions derivedfrom the
analysis ofsection 8.3. All equations satisfy the conditions for identifica-
tion ofmodels involving nonlinearities in the endogenous variables. We
estimated each equation over our twenty industry sample for the years
1963, 1967, and 1972. For each specification reported in this section we
could not reject the hypothesis ofhomogeneity across time periods. We
thereforelimit discussionto theresultsobtainedusing thepooledsample.
Each equation was estimated using single equation instrumental vari-
ables techniques involving linear approximations to the reduced forms.
For the private R&D equation we attempted the Hildreth-Houck GLS
correction to take account of possible heteroscedasticity in the disturb-
ance term. A decomposition of the residuals, however, revealed no
evidence of heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, the GLS estimates and
theirstandarderrorswere not much different from those obtained by the194 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
Table 8.3 Expected Signs and Magnitudes of Structural Coefficients
Variable LOG(H) RDINT LOG(S) GOVRDS
LOG(e) + 1.0 -1.0





















CONSTANT 0.0 7 7 7
uncorrected instrumental variables procedure. For these reasons, we
proceed as if (J"~ == 0, and we report the uncorrected parameterestimates
and standard errors in table 8.5 below.
Overall the results are quite encouraging given the small sample size,
the degree of aggregation, and the potential measurement errors in our
data. The signs ofvirtually all coefficients in the privateR&D equation
are in agreement with our predictions in table 8.3. Further, the point
estimates are remarkably robust to minor modifications in the specifica-
tion, and many coefficients are significant at a size of .01. The results for
the concentration, advertising, and government R&D equations are
less encouraging than those of the company R&D equation. Here the
specifications are quite sensitive to our implied restrictions. We now
proceed to a more detailed discussion of the results.
8.5.1 The Concentration Equation
Table 8.4 reports the results of estimating two variants of the concen-
tration equation (21). Clearly, the estimated coefficients fail to conform
to ourprecise predictions about their magnitudes. In specifications (4-1),
we decisively reject the hypothesis that the constant is equal to zero, and
thestricthypotheses thatal == a2 == 1are also clearly rejected, separately195 Tests of a Schumpeterian Model of R&D and Market Structure



















***Asymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .01 level (one-tailed test).
tttAsymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .01 level (two-tailed test).
and jointly. On the other hand, the term representing cost-reducing and
demand-shifting activities [LOG (R + S)] is significantly greater than
zero at the .01 level.
Matters improve substantially when we impose the restriction that the
constant term equal zero. The price elasticity coefficient remains insig-
nificantly different from zero and significantly below one, but it has the
correct sign in (4-2). The coefficient on LOG(R +S) jumps dramatically
to a value not far from our prediction. We must nevertheless reject the
hypothesis that a2 == 1.
We also explored variants of equation (22) in which advertising is
excluded from the model. These results were similar to those reported in
table 8.4. The price elasticity coefficient was much too small, and it had
the wrong sign when the constant was included. The coefficient of
LOG(R) was below0.2 when the constantwas included, andit jumpedto
0.57 when the zero restriction was imposed. These specifications are not
nested in (4-1) and (4-2), so we did not test the restriction implicit in the
Dasgupta-Stiglitz model that advertising has no effect on concentration.
The failure of (4-1) and (4-2) to conform precisely to theoretical
expectations is hardly surprising, given our highly aggregated data and
thepotentialfor measurement errorin the price elasticities. Moreover, it
is likely that the concentration equation is particularly sensitive to our
neglectofdynamics. A less stylized theoryofSchumpeteriancompetition
would surely model concentration as the outcome of a sequence of past
and current investments in R&D and advertising, rather than as a
contemporaneously determined variable.
8.5.2 The Company R&D Equation
The results for several variants of the company R&D equation (24)
are presentedin table 8.5. Note at theoutsetthatthe 'Y function reflecting196 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
Table 8.5 Parameter Estimates: R&D Equation (asymptotic standard errors
in parentheses)
8, 'Y Unrestricted 'Y = Cons. 'Y, 8 = 0 8=n
Variable (5-1) (5-2) (5-3) (5-4) (5-5)
ELEC -0.038 0.017* 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.029***
(0.027) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
CHEM -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.004
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
BIO 0.064tt 0.060ttt 0.053tt 0.043t 0.038t
(0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
MECH 0.004 0.009 0.017t 0.021tt 0.017t
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
BASIC 0.101 0.259*** 0.299*** 0.349*** 0.358***
(0.153) (0.100) (0.104) (0.098) (0.098)
AGE/100 0.152 -0.106t - 0.155tt - 0.147tt -0.121t
(0.135) (0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.069)
AGESQ/100 -0.0016 0.0012t 0.0018tt 0.0017tt 0.OO15t
(0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
GOVRDS 2.694*** 0.078** 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.115***
(1.005) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)








CONSTANT -0.054 0.009 0.020 0.021 0.008
(0.033) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.030)
Mean of dep.
variable 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
Std. error 0.022 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017
*Asymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .10 level (one-tailed test).
**Asymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .05 level (one-tailed test).
***Asymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .01 level (one-tailed test).
tAsymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .10 level (two-tailed test).
ttAsymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .05 level (two-tailed test).
tttAsymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .01 level (two-tailed test).
the technological dimension of spillovers is modeled by including only a
constant term, PROD and GOVRDS, as arguments. Inclusion of both
PROD and BORROW in the regressions produced less satisfactory
results, probably because oftheir near collinearity. Since PROD had the
more robustparameterestimatesoverarangeofspecifications, we report
results for variants of (24) omitting BORROW.
The most general form of (24) is where the value ofeis arbitrary but197 Tests of a Schumpeterian Model of R&D and Market Structure
constant across industries, as in (5-1) and (5-2). IfR&D spillovers are
assumed to be greater for products than for processes (i.e., PROD has a
positive coefficient in the 'Y function), then the estimated coefficients
imply thateis greater than zero. Thus, firms appear to maintain positive
conjectural variations with respect to R&D, although the free-rider
effect could still be present if 0 < e < 1.
A somewhat surprising result of (5-1) is that the coefficient on
H*GOVRDSis negative, suggestingthatgovernmentfunding diminishes
spillovers. Although this contradicts our earlier expectation, the result is
plausiblefor several reasons. Mostprominently, much governmentfund-
ing supports R&D for large-scale, capital-intensive defense systems
which are not cheaply replicable despite mandatory licensing and tech-
nology transfer provisions.
Specification (5-2) omits H*GOVRDS on the hypothesis that another
reason for its unexpected sign may be its near collinearity with the
opportunity vector. Once again, GOVRDS is significantly positive,
although its effect on the cost elasticity is relatively small. The magnitude
of the coefficient indicates that on average a one dollar increase in
government R&D spending leads to a seven cent increase in company
R&D spending. Estimates for specifications (5-3) through (5-5) are
about eleven cents; however, at the means (5-1) yields a predicted effect
of seventy-four cents. The other opportunity vatiables in (5-2) come in
strongly with the correct signs.
Specifications (5-3) and (5-4) represent two restricted versions of(5-1)
and (5-2). In (5-3) we test the hypothesis that 'Y is a constant across all
industries. The positive coefficient on the Herfindahl index indicates that
eis greater than zero under the implicit assumption that 'Y is greater than
zero. In any case, Wald tests indicate that either (5-1) or (5-2) is to be
preferred to (5-3).
Specification (5-4) corresponds to a Dasgupta-Stiglitz world with no
R&D spillovers. Interestingly enough, this equation does quite well in
that all the opportunity variables are of the correct sign and highly
significant. Furthermore, the point estimates of the opportunity coef-
ficients differ only slightly from those in (5-2). However, Wald tests on
the hypothesis that either 'Y or e equals zero lead to rejection of the
Dasgupta-Stiglitz model in favor of (5-1) or (5-2). The X
2 statistics are
respectively X
2(3) == 10.2 and X
2(2) == 6.8.
The final specification we report is the "constant shares" case where e
equals n and thus varies across industries. Once again the results accord
reasonably well with the previous versions ofthe companyR&D equa-
tion. Interestingly, we cannot reject the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model in favor
of the constant shares case, given the insignificance ofthe coefficient of
PROD. Unfortunately, we are unable to test (5-5) against the other
versions, since (5-5) is not nested in the e, 'Y unrestricted cases.
Since it is widespread practice to treat concentration and government198 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
R&D as exogenous variables in empirical models of the determination
ofcompanyR&D, it is interesting to ask whether anything is gained by
treating them as endogenous. We checked for the possibility of simul-
taneity bias using the test proposed by Wu (1973). For each specification
in table 8.5, we decisively rejected the hypothesis that the regressors we
take to be stochastic were in fact uncorrelated with the disturbances.
Asfurther checks onthemodels (5-1)-(5-5), we have tested the plausi-
bility of our parameterization of a and the reasonableness of the oppor-
tunity measures. Operationally this was done by excluding the opportu-
nity measuresfrom all five equations. TheresultingWaldstatistics, which
are asymptotically distributed as X
2 random variables with eight degrees
of freedom, all exceeded the critical value at the .001 level. Thus, we
decisively reject the a constant version of the model.
We also computed the implied cost function parameters in those in-
stances where it was feasible to do so. Table 8.6 reports the estimated
valuesof&for eachindustryin 1972, derivedfrom equation(5-4), and the
estimated values of & + :V, derived from equation (5-5). The results
accord well with expectations. The implied elasticity of unit cost with
respect to companyR&D ranges from near zero in textiles, paper, and
fabricated metal products to the 0.05-0.07 range in aircraft, drugs, and
Table 8.6 Estimated Cost Elasticities and Actual R&D Intensity for Sample
Industries, 1972
Industry
Food and kindred products
Textiles products and apparel
Lumber, wood products, and furniture




Petroleum refining and related industries
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products
Ferrous metals and products
Nonferrous metals and products
Fabricated metal products
Machinery, except electrical
Communication equipment and electronic components
Other electrical equipment
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment
Aricraft and parts
Scientific and mechanical measuring instruments
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electronics. Table8.6 also includesthe 1972valuesofR & D intensityfor
convenient reference.
Finally, before turning to the advertising equation, we shall interpret
the coefficients on the industry age variables. The signs on the age and
age-squared coefficients suggest that once an industry is defined by the
Census, it already faces declining opportunities for R&D. The magni-
tudes of these coefficients imply that opportunities decline for forty to
forty-five years after definition, at which point they increase again. De-
pending on the specification, the standard error for the estimate of this
turning point is between five and six years.
8.5.3 The Advertising Equation
Estimation of the advertising equation yields results that are not en-
tirely satisfactory. As table 8.7 reveals, in the theoretically preferred
specification (7-1), the coefficient on the concentration term has the
wrong sign; a result which corresponds to that reported in Levin (1981).
Moreover, the price elasticity of demand has a coefficient smaller in
absolute value than its expected magnitude. Indeed, the hypothesis that
d2 == -1 is decisively rejected at better than a .001 level. The determi-
nants of <P, the advertising elasticity of demand, fare somewhat better.
Both PCE and DUR have the expected signs, although the interaction
term does not.
We have no prior expectation about the constant term, since it repre-






























*Asymptotic [-ratio indicates significance at .10 level (one-tailed test).
***Asymptotic [-ratio indicates significance at .01 level (one-tailed test).
tttAsymptotic [-ratio indicates significance at .01 level (two-tailed test).200 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
sentsthe sum ofdo, which is expectedto bezero, and d1gO, which involves
the constant in the <t> function. Ifwe constrain both do and go to be zero,
however, the results improve markedly. The price elasticity coefficient
reverses sign, but the remaining coefficients in (7-2) have the correct
signs. The concentration term is now significantly different from zero,
although the hypothesis that d3 = 1 must be rejected at the .001 level.
Each ofthe arguments ofthe <f> function now has the predicted sign, and
the hypothesis that <t>(.) is simply a constant across all industries can be
rejected for both specifications (7-1) and (7-2). In the former case, the
hypothesis that <t> is aconstantyields a teststatisticthatis X
2(3) = 37.1. In
the latter case, the test that <t> = 0 is X
2(3) = 104.4.
The poor performance of the price elasticity variable in both this and
the concentration equationcalls attention to the very strong assumptions
underwhich theelasticities were computed. Some further work is needed
here; in future work we intend to employ alternative elasticityestimates.
8.5.4 The Government R&D Equation
As expected, the results in table 8.8 indicate that the allocation of
governmentR&D expenditures is influenced most strongly by govern-
ment defense procurement; the government supports R&D in those
industries in which it is a major customer. Technological opportunity
appears to offer little incentive to the government; of our opportunity
measures only AGE and AGESQ are statistically significant at conven-
tionallevels. Interestingly, the signs of these coefficients are the reverse
ofthose in most specifications ofthe privateR&D equation. Given our
expectation that the age profile proxies opportunity by first rising and
then falling, we might tentatively note that the pattern of signs in tables
8.5 and 8.8 is consistent with the view that the government reacts to
technological opportunity with a substantial lag relative to private in-
dustry.
The technological dimension of spillovers, here proxied by
BORROW, appears to have some effect on government R&D; as
expected, a higher degree ofspillover increases the likelihood ofgovern-
ment support. Again collinearity among the appropriability measures
leads to better results when either PROD or BORROW is excluded. In
this case, BORROW has the more plausible parameter estimate and a
lower relative standard error. The structural dimension of appropriabil-
ity, here represented by concentration, has the expected sign but falls
well short of statistical significance. The remaining coefficients in the
equation are almost completely insensitive to the exclusion of this vari-
able, as shown in (8-2). This suggests that GOVRDS is not strictly
endogenous, althoughits dependenceonopportunityand appropriability
conditions indicates that it is correlated with the errorterm in the private201 Tests of a Schumpeterian Model of R&D and Market Structure




























Std. error 0.024 0.024
*Asymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .10 level (one-tailed test).
**Asymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .05 level (one-tailed test).
***Asymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .01 level (one-tailed test).
ttAsymptotic t-ratio indicates significance at .05 level (two-tailed test).
R&D equation. Thus, the use ofinstrumental variables for GOVRDS
seems appropriate.
8.6 Conclusions
Given the deficiencies of the variables used to measure technological
opportunity and appropriability conditions, as well as the highly aggre-
gated nature of the data, the results reported in section 8.5 are quite
encouraging. Althoughthestatisticaltests arenotentirelyconsistentwith
ourtheoretical model, on the whole the findings support the Schumpete-
rian view thatR&D investment and market structure are appropriately202 Richard C. Levin/Peter C. Reiss
regarded as jointlydetermined outcomes ofthe competitive process. The
privateR&Dequationperformsespeciallywell, yieldingresults that are
quite robust and yet sufficiently precise to reject decisively the hypoth-
eses that opportunity and appropriability conditions do not matter. In-
deed, the private R&D results are substantially better than those
obtainedin the looser, more inclusive, specification in the earlierwork of
Levin (1981). The parameters of the concentration equation fail to con-
form to the precise predictions ofour model, but the results nevertheless
suggest a strong and significant connection between cost-reducing and
demand-shifting activities and market concentration.
We do not wish to make exaggerated claims for our highly stylized
theoretical model, which abstracts from obviously important features of
Schumpeterian competition, such as dynamics and the heterogeneity of
firms. But we believe that the model does place proper emphasis on
demand, technological opportunity, and appropriability as the central
forces determining the allocation ofR&D and the evolution ofmarket
structure. In particular, we believe our treatment of R&D spillovers,
which distinguishes clearly the technological, structural, and behavioral
dimensions of appropriability, exemplifies how useful insights may be
gained from relatively stark and stylized models. Moreover, our model
brings to the foreground a thread linking much of the theoretical litera-
ture of the "new industrial organization": the endogeneity of market
structure. Indeed, the recognition that market structure is endogenous is
an element common to the literatures on Schumpeterian competition,
monopolistic competition, strategic entry deterrence, and contestability.
As these theoretical literatures continue to revise our understanding of
structure-conduct-performance relationships, we will undoubtedly see
more empirical work of the type represented here.
Itis well to keep in mind, however, boththe strengths and weaknesses
of empirical work based on highly stylized analytic models. On the one
hand, such models have the virtue of simplicity, of clear and precise
hypotheses. Onthe otherhand, importantfeatures ofreality are brushed
aside. To this extent our insights are only partial truths.
The present paper exemplifies this dilemma. We have tested a simple
modelwhichcapturesmuchthatis important. Butamodel ofSchumpete-
rian competitionwithoutdynamics, withouttransientmonopoly, without
innovators and imitators, is, atbest, only partofthe story. Much remains
to be done.203 Tests of a Schumpeterian Model of R&D and Market Structure
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Comment Pankaj Tandon
This is an interesting paper, since it seeks to initiate the difficult task of
building bridges between recent theoretical work on R&D and the
empiricalworkonthissubject, ofwhich we haveseenmanyfine examples
at this conference. I welcome this bridge-building activity, butbelieve, as
the authors do, that much remains to be done. I will therefore concen-
trate my remarks on the general modeling approach and on some ofthe
problems that need special attention.
The authors are obviously aware of many of the modeling problems
involved here, and they have commented on several. I will reemphasize
only one-the question of timing. When one considers timing, it is
probable-as the authors point out-that the effect of technological
change on market structure is a long-term effect, one that cannot be
easily capturedin tests thatspan only ten years. Seenin this light, it is not
surprising that the concentration equation fails to be convincing. On the
other hand, the influence of market structure on R&D investment
decisions is more likely to be captured in a short panel. As a short-run
approximation, it is probably reasonable to assume a fixed market struc-
ture. Thus, the relative success ofthe R&D intensity equation was also
to be expected.
Let me comment on what the authors mention as the two major
contributions of their approach. The first relates to the inclusion of
advertising as another variable influencing and being influenced by mar-
ket structure. Though the authors comment on the similarity between
advertising andR&D as instruments ofcompetition, they treatthemin
quite an asymmetric manner in their model. Specifically, the way adver-
tising is included is to model the aggregate industry demand curve as
depending on the aggregate level of advertising in the industry. Thus, if
there are n firms in the industry, any firm doing advertising gets in effect
only l/nth ofthe increase in demand. Clearly this does not really capture
the competitive characteristics ofadvertising; rather, advertising acquires
the characteristics of a public good-with a serious attendant free-rider
problem. The correspondingtreatmentfor R&D would be to say that a
firm's unit cost is a function only of Z (aggregate industry R&D). This
doesn'tseem reasonable. Likewise, I don'tfind thetreatmentofadvertis-
ing convincing. Theresults from the advertising equation are notsatisfac-
tory in any case and might be better explained by a story that concen-
tratedonthe role ofadvertisingin productdifferentiation. I don'tknowif
I'mjustrevealing my bias as someone primarilyinterestedinR&D, but
I think I'd be happier with advertising left out of the model. Another
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reasonfor this is thatit is far from clearto me thatR&D andadvertising
are jointly determined. In a model with uncertain R&D outcomes,
advertising may besequentially determined, conditionedonthe results of
R&D.
Since theprimaryinterestofthis group is R&D, letmemove onto the
second, more interesting point, namely, the model ofR&D spillovers.
This is surely welcome. The public goods aspect ofR&D has received
insufficient attention in the theoretical and empirical literature, yet it is
one of the things that makes R&D particularly interesting and distinct
from traditional investment. I am, however, a little uncomfortable with
the way spillovers have been modeled here. The authors have taken the
unit cost of production to be a function of the firm's own R&D and of
aggregate industry R&D. I have two problems with this. First, as is
clearly evidenced by Professor Scherer's work on interindustry technol-
ogy flows, spillovers are also important across industries. This will be of
special importance when, as the authors promise us, more disaggregated
data at the four-digit level are used. Further, such cross-industry exter-
nalities may be quite important in determining market structure in user
industries. Two obvious examples spring to mind. The development of
small, powerful computers will surely be important, although it is not
clearwhether the major influence will be to increase ordecrease concen-
tration. It seems that minimum efficient scale may be significantly re-
duced in many industries. On the other hand, small computers may
combine with the second example, improved telecommunications capa-
bilities, to considerably ease the control problem in large corporations.
This would clearly tend to increase concentration. Some attention must
be paid to these interindustry externalities.
The second problem with the spillover analysis concerns the logical
consistencyofthe model. All firms in an industry are assumed to face the
same technological opportunities. We then concentrate on symmetric
equilibria. Intheabsenceofuncertainty, theonlylogicalinterpretation of
such anequilibriumis thateveryfirm has discovered the same things. But
then, why should theR&D ofother firms be ofany value to me, since I
already know what they know? (Infact, this logic would say that the only
permissible spillovers would be interindustry!) I grant that a model with
asymmetricinformation anduncertainty-evenwith symmetry-isgoing
to be analytically much less tractable, and it is not obvious that the
estimable equationswould be structurallydifferent, butI do worry about
the logical anomaly.
The spillovers were nevertheless an interesting addition to the model,
particularly because ofa side product that was generated. Including Z in
the cost function enabled the authors to begin to model different be-
havioral hypotheses aboutfirms, specifically: Whatare firms' conjectures
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nately, the authors are not able to get clear answers on this, mainly
because the conjectural parameter e appears multiplicatively with the
appropriability parameter 'Y. I have two suggestions. First, Z could be
measured excluding the firm's own R&D. This seems conceptually
preferable anyway, although I grant that at this level of aggregation it
may not appearimportant. However, the interpretationofewill be quite
different and, in particular, its sign will matter. Now e = 0 will corre-
spond to the Cournot conjecture, ewill be negative for free-rider situa-
tions, and e will be positive for what might be called Schumpeterian
conjectures. Underthe assumptionthat 'Y is positive, itwill bepossible to
runtestsonthesignofe. Inthepresentversion,eis alwayspositive, andit
is notpossible to find its magnitude distinctlyfrom 'Y. Ofcourse, equation
(13) would have to bemodified-then in the denominatorwould have to
be replaced by (n - I)-and perhaps other things would change in the
model. The second suggestion is that perhaps a model that pays more
explicit attention to product differentiation may be more successful and
desirable. In other words, we might get more directly at the conjectural
hypotheses by thinking aboutthefirm's demandorprice beinginfluenced
by other firms' costs.
A specific comment here: In regression (5-4), the R&D equation for
the Dasgupta-Stiglitz case, the authors do not tell us if the left-hand side
was modified to beRI(l - R). Advertising surely ought to be excluded if
the equation is to represent the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model.
I have a couple of other brief comments. We have not seen the
conditions that ensure the existence ofsymmetric equilibria, but we can
easily guess the parametersthatmust appearthere. Since it is well known
thatR&D causes nonconvexities, it is ofsome interestto make sure that
the existence conditions are being satisfied. It would be useful if the
authors provided thatinformation. Further, since ex, the elasticity ofunit
costwith respecttoR&D, is estimablein theirmodel, itwould beuseful
to report it and to compare it with the many other estimates of this
parameter or its variants that exist in the literature.
One noticeable feature of this paper is how distinct it is methodologi-
cally from other papers presented at this conference. I think it may be
useful for the authors in their bridge-building activity to look again at the
work of Pakes and Schankerman (this volume) on the determinants of
research intensity. This is perhaps the clearest exposition of the tradi-
tional approach, and it might be productive to attempt to modify this
approach with an endogenous market structure.
Finally, let me say what I think is most attractive about this line of
work. The significant way in which the endogenous market structure
approach differs from the traditional approach is that the new approach
introduces a zero-profit condition. This corresponds to what Scherer, in
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effect. I think that it is entirely possible that this Lebensraum effect
actually is the dominant consideration in R&D allocations, especially
because ofthe serious possibility ofnonconvexities. Consideration ofthe
Lebensraum effect might also have implications for patent policy or
antitrust. Forexample, someverycrudeHarberger-typecalculationsthat
I have done indicate thatin industries where technological opportunity is
high, the optimal market structure may be quite concentrated, precisely
because of the Lebensraum effect. The trade-off between static and
dynamic efficiency is very explicit in Schumpeter's work, and the
approach of Levin and Reiss is a first step toward the integration ofthis
trade-off into empirical work on R&D.